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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amy Lynn Shoemaker appeals the district court’s denial of her motion in
limine.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Shoemaker with felony driving under the influence.
(R., pp. 59-61.) The felony enhancement in this case was predicated on a 2007
felony DUI guilty plea. (R., pp. 62-63.)
Shoemaker filed a motion in limine to exclude introduction of any evidence
of the 2007 case. (R., pp. 72-74, 79-81.) She noted that the prior case “was
dismissed on June 25, 2009 in response to defendant’s successful completion of
drug court.” (R., p. 72.) Shoemaker contended that after she pleaded guilty in
the 2007 case, the case “did not proceed to sentencing” and “no Judgment of
Conviction ever was entered” against her, and therefore evidence of the 2007
conviction was inadmissible in this case.

(R., pp. 72-73, 79.)

The state

responded that per the plain language of the relevant statute and controlling
case law the 2007 guilty plea was a valid predicate for a felony DUI
enhancement. (R., pp. 83-91.)
The district court denied Shoemaker’s motion, basing its decision on State
v. Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 319 P.3d 1191 (2014) and State v. Reed, 149 Idaho
901, 243 P.3d 1089 (Ct. App. 2010). (R., pp. 125-26.) Thereafter, Shoemaker
pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of her motion, and
timely did so. (R., pp. 123-24, 127-29, 154-57.)
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ISSUE
Shoemaker states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Shoemaker’s motion in
limine?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Shoemaker failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion
in limine?
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ARGUMENT
Shoemaker Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying Her Motion
In Limine
A.

Introduction
Shoemaker contends the district court erred by denying her motion in

limine to exclude evidence of her 2007 DUI conviction. She argues on appeal
that the court erred “because the [2007] case did not proceed to sentencing and
she was transferred to drug court, and the guilty plea was eventually set aside
and the case was dismissed.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
This argument fails. Based on the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 and
this Court’s holding in Glenn, Shoemaker’s prior guilty plea is a valid predicate
for a sentencing enhancement in this case. The district court correctly concluded
the same.
B.

Standard Of Review
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575,

199 P.3d 123, 150 (2008).
C.

Shoemaker Pleaded Guilty To Felony DUI In 2007 And Per The Plain
Language Of The Controlling Statute And Caselaw, This Was A Sufficient
Predicate For The Sentencing Enhancement In This Case
The Idaho Code sets forth the following sentencing enhancement for

repeat DUI offenders:
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this
section, any person who has pled guilty or has been found
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guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004,
Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 188004C, Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 188006, Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-4006
3. (b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or
withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign
criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years
pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions
of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall
be sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of this section.
I.C. § 18-8005(9) (emphasis added).
This Court addressed this statute’s plain language in State v. Glenn,
156 Idaho 22, 319 P.3d 1191 (2014).

Presenting a similar argument, the

defendant there moved to dismiss a felony DUI, noting that it was predicated on
a prior DUI that had ultimately been dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.
Glenn, 156 Idaho at 23, 319 P.3d at 1192.

Glenn argued on appeal that

because the prior conviction “was dismissed, there was no prior conviction for
the State to base its enhancement on.” Id.
This Court disagreed, citing the plain statutory language:
I.C. § 18–8005 provides sentencing enhancements for any person
who “pled guilty or has been found guilty” of more than one DUI
within a specified amount of time, which applies when there is a
determination of guilt by a conviction or plea. The focus of
I.C. § 18–8005 is then not on performance during probation, but
instead on the instant the finding of guilt is made either by the jury
or the defendant’s plea. Here, Glenn was a person who pled
guilty to more than one DUI within fifteen years.
Glenn, 156 Idaho at 25, 319 P.3d at 1194 (emphasis added, internal citations
omitted).

Moreover, this Court found that “withdrawing a guilty plea and

dismissing the case does not change the fact that the defendant pled guilty or
was found guilty,” and I.C. § 18-8005 “does not require a current conviction or
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judgment; it applies whenever a person ‘pled guilty or has been found guilty.’” Id.
at 26, 319 P.3d at 1195.

This Court concluded that the statute was

“unambiguous” in its application to Glenn, “because Glenn was a person who in
2010 pled guilty to a DUI within fifteen years of pleading guilty to a previous
felony DUI.” Id.
Here, the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 resolves the only issue on
appeal. Shoemaker pleaded guilty to felony DUI in 2007, thus establishing the
predicate for a felony enhancement in this case. (Defense Ex. 2 (Marked as
State’s Ex. 2)); I.C. § 18-8005(9); Glenn, 156 Idaho at 24-26, 319 P.3d at 119395. Shoemaker argues that the district court erred “because the case did not
proceed to sentencing and she was transferred to drug court, and the guilty plea
was eventually set aside and the case was dismissed.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)
But this argument fails in light of Glenn, which found the issue was simply
“whether a defendant has pled guilty to a previous DUI.” Glenn, 156 Idaho at 26,
319 P.3d at 1195. Because Shoemaker pleaded guilty in 2007—regardless of
any subsequent procedural history—the statute plainly applies.
Shoemaker pleaded guilty to a felony DUI in 2007 thus establishing the
predicate for a felony sentencing enhancement in this case. The district court
therefore correctly applied the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005 and Glenn when
it denied Shoemaker’s motion in limine.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order
denying Shoemaker’s motion in limine.
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2016.
_/s/ Kale D. Gans_______
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of November, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing
an electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KDG/dd

__Kale D. Gans__________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

6

